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CASENOTES
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY V. GILBERT:
THE PLIGHT OF THE WORKING WOMAN
Historically, the legislative and judicial branches of the government have been faced with the problem of defining the role of
women in society and determining whether certain practices by
states and private employers constitute sex discrimination. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sex discrimination cases arose under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 These cases involved state legislation concerning the unequal treatment of men and women in their choices
of profession, 2 employment 3 and hours. 4 In deciding these cases
the Supreme Court applied the fourteenth amendment rational
basis test 5 and concluded that the state's purpose in protecting
women so that they may carry out their maternal functions justi6
fied the legislation.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV

§ 1.

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (emphasis added).
2. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding
the right of the State of Illinois to deny a woman a license to practice
law).
3. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute prohibiting a woman from tending bar unless she was the
wife or daughter of a male owner).
4. See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding a New
York statute which did not allow women to work in restaurants at
night); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute which did not allow women to work in certain establishments more
than ten hours a day).
5. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 657 (9th ed. 1976). The

rational basis test, sometimes referred to as the minimal scrutiny test

or permissive review, upholds classifications if the court can find a
rational relationship between their existence and the legislative goal
which the state is trying to achieve.
6. See notes 2-4 supra.
The courts took the view that if they limited the woman's role outside the home, they were promoting not only her health and welfare,
but also preserving the well-being of the race.
Justice Bradley, in his concurring opinion in Bradwell v. State, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), summed up the general attitude of the

judiciary when he stated:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex

evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the

divine ordinance as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
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In 1920 a significant change in favor of women's rights came
about with the passage of the nineteenth amendment giving
women the right to vote. 7 However, social attitudes toward
women have been slow to change. As late as 1961 the Supreme
Court was still using the protective rationale of the earlier
twentieth century cases when it upheld a Florida statute exempting women from jury service."
In 1963, Congress began taking positive steps to combat sex
discrimination by passing the Equal Pay Act as part of the Fair
Labor Standards statute. This provision outlawed sex discrimination in the payment of wages to employees performing jobs
requiring equal skill and responsibilities under similar conditions. In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
which stated that a private employer could no longer discriminate
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, 10
unless such discrimination was based on a bona fide occupational qualification."
functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband....
te .* The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator.
Id. at 141.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex."
8. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). This case was finally overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), where the Court held
that barring women from jury service was an unconstitutional denial
of the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970) reads in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii)
a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) provides:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter . . . (1) it
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Following the congressional acts of the sixties, the Supreme
Court's decisions in Reed v. Reed" ' and Frontierov. Richardson1 "
demonstrated a change in the Court's attitude toward sex discrimination under the fourteenth amendment.' 4 In Reed, the
Court held that a classification based on sex must bear a "fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."""
The plurality opinion in Frontiero attempted to carry this a step
further by finding sex to be a suspect classification subject to
strict judicial scrutiny' 6 but failed to do so because the concurring opinion maintained that as long as this case could be decided
on the basis of Reed, strict scrutiny was not necessary. 1T However, in one of the most recent fourteenth amendment cases concerning sex discrimination, Geduldig v. Aiello,18 the Court
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex or

national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.
12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
13. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
14. But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) where the Court

upheld a "for widows only" property tax exemption using the rational

basis test; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) where the Court

upheld a statute guaranteeing female officers 13 years of commissioned
service before a mandatory discharge for want of promotion, while male

officers were only allowed nine years.

15. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (emphasis added). In this
case, the Court declared an Idaho probate statute unconstitutional under

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because men
were given preference over women when both were of the same entitle-

ment class for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate.
16. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute which provided that a serviceman may claim his
wife as a dependent without regard as to whether she really was,
whereas a servicewoman had to prove that her husband was a dependent
before she could claim him as one.

For a discussion of the standard of strict judicial scrutiny see G.
A stricter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 658-59 (9th ed. 1976).

GUNTHER,

standard of review is used in instances where discrimination is based
upon a suspect classification or concerns a fundamental right. If such

a test is invoked by the Court, the state must show a "compelling state
interest" for maintaining such classifications before they are upheld.
This is oftentimes called strict judicial scrutiny or active review.
The Supreme Court has held that the following classifications are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (alienage); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (voting); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national
origin); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
17. 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). The concurring
opinion further stated that it was reluctant at this time to categorize
sex as a suspect classification, due to the pendency of the equal rights

amendment, which would resolve this issue. "To act before its passage,
would be to perform a legislative duty, not appropriate for the Court."
Id.
18. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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seemed to be slowing its pace in eliminating unequal treatment
between men and women.
In Geduldig, the Supreme Court held that a California state
disability plan which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities did
not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Following Geduldig, several lower courts
reviewed private employment disability plans which excluded
pregnancy under Title VII. 1
In contrast to Geduldig, these
courts held that the disability plans constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, distinguishing Geduldig on the
ground that it was a fourteenth amendment case. 2 1 It was
in view of this conflict that the case of General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert21 came before the Supreme Court.
FACTS AND FINDINGS OF THE

LOWER

COURTS

Seeking both declaratory relief and damages, Martha Gilbert
and other female employees of defendant General Electric Company 22 brought a class action 23 arising out of defendant's refusal
19. See, e.g., Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975);
Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.
1975); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Communication Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1975); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D.
Iowa 1975); Vineyard v. Hollister Elementary School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 380 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
20. See Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel and Gilbert
in the Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, 147-51 (1976).
21. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
22. The individual plaintiffs were present or former employees of
General Electric's Salem, Virginia plant who became pregnant during
1971 or 1972 and who presented claims for disability benefits which were
denied.
Named as co-plaintiffs in this action were the International Union
of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, the bargaining
representative for employees of General Electric at plants throughout
the United States and Local 161, which represents employees at the
Salem, Virginia plant.
23. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267, 272 (E.D. Va. 1973),
where the court held that the class met the requirements of FED. R. Civ.
P. 23 (a) (d) (2).

The named plaintiffs were designated as class representatives for
the class composed of all females who were or had ever been employed
on or after the date measured at ninety days prior to the earliest date
of the filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or who became employed during the pendency of the suit and
also all females whose claims were filed before such date and were still
pending on such date. This class was composed of approximately 100,000
women, employed nationwide by General Electric. Id.
The named plaintiffs were also designated as class representatives
of the subclass seeking damages. It was composed of those female employees who were or had been employed by General Electric during the
period stated above and who had suffered damages as a result of being
unable to work due to childbirth on or after such date. The subclass
numbered approximately 5,659 female employees. Id.
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to provide them with disability benefits for absence due to
pregnancy and childbirth.2 4 The insurance plan under attack
provided nonoccupational sickness and accident benefit payments for a wide range of disabilities; however, disabilities relat2
ing to pregnancy, miscarriage and childbirth were excluded. 5
The district court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities was "sex discrimination" in violation of Title
VrI, and the relief prayed for was granted. 2" The Fourth Cir24. These charges were first filed with the Equal Employment Oppor-

tunity Commission and were then processed by the Commission as required by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The
Commission found reasonable cause to believe that General Electric was
engaged in acts of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII by excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from its insurance plan. Attempts at
conciliation proved unsuccessful and the case was then filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
After several procedural questions concerning proper venue, (Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Va. 1972)); compulsory
joinder, (Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 273 (E.D. Va. 1973));
counterclaims, (Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va.
1973)); and class determination, (Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D.
267 (E.D. Va. 1973)) were decided, the district court proceeded to hear
the case on the merits. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367
(E.D. Va. 1974).
25. The General Electric Insurance Plan with Comprehensive Medical
Expense Benefits, as amended January 26, 1970, provides nonoccupational sickness and accident benefit payments to all employees in an
amount equal to 60% of an employee's straight time earnings. Payments
were to begin on the eighth day of total disability and continue for a
maximum of 26 weeks for any one continuous period of disability or successive periods due to the same or related causes. Benefit payment
coverage would terminate on the date active work ceased because of
disability or pregnancy.
The plan would pay disability benefits for male or female employees
due to the following causes:
(a) sclerosis of the liver
(b) lung cancer
(c) emphysema
(d) injury incurred in auto accident
(e) injury incurred in sport activity of employee
(f) injury incurred in a fight
(g) following a program for the cure of alcoholism
(h) injury incurred in an attempted suicide
(i) drug addiction
(j) following a program for the cure of drug addiction
(k) sterilization
(1) elective surgical operations unrelated to pregnancy
(in)

elective plastic surgery

(n) following a program of psychiatric treatment.
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 374 (E.D. Va. 1974).
In addition, General Electric provided income for present and former
employees who for various other reasons are unable to work. For example, it maintained policies covering medical expenses for not only present employees and their dependents, but also pensioners and 'their dependents, benefits in case of layoffs, supplemental military pay benefits
for employees serving in the Armed Services and attending training
camps or participating in emergency duty and retirement income under
a pension plan. Brief for Appellee at 95, Gilbert v. General Elec. Co.,
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
26. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
In reaching its decision, the court made the following specific findings:
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cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court holding. 27 On
appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari28 to resolve the
question as to whether the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability benefits constituted sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII.
GILBERT IN THE SUPREME COURT

In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
reversed the holding of the lower courts and held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a disability plan
is not sex discrimination and therefore not a violation of Title
VII.2 9 In reaching its holding, the Court was faced with determining what Congress intended the term "sex discrimina(1) While pregnancy is perhaps most often voluntary, a substantial
incidence of negligent or accidental conception also occurs.
(2) Pregnancy, per se, is not a disease.
(3) A pregnancy without complications is normally disabling for a
period of six to eight weeks, which time includes the period from
labor and delivery or slightly before, through several weeks of recuperation.
(4) Ten percent of pregnancies are terminated by miscarriage, which
is disabling.
(5) Five percent of pregnancies are complicated by diseases which
are found in nonpregnant persons but which may have been stimulated by pregnancy. Five percent of pregnancies are complicated
by pregnancy-related diseases.
These complications are diseases
which may lead to disability.
Id. at 377.
The court also found that the plan was objectionable because it excluded from coverage a disability unique to women while including disabilities which affect only men. Id. at 382.
The court further found that despite substantial testimony and statistics relating to the enormous increased cost of the plan if pregnancy were
included, it was of too speculative a nature to be of probative value
in determining actual future costs. Id. at 379.
In holding General Electric's actions to be deliberate and intentional,
the court stated:
There is no rational distinction to be drawn between pregnancy-related disabilities and a disability arising from any other cause. The
defendant does not exclude from coverage any disability because it
was voluntarily incurred other than disabilities arising from childbirth and other pregnancy-related conditions. That this is sex discrimination is self-evident.
Id. at 385-86.
27. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975). The
majority took note of the Geduldig case which had been decided a year
earlier and found that it was not controlling, distinguishing it as a case
treating sex discrimination under the fourteenth amendment and not as
a case under Title VII. Therefore, since the case at bar was one of statutory interpretation and not constitutional analysis, the issues presented
and the approach taken by the court in resolving the issues had to be
different.
To satisfy constitutional Equal Protection standards, a discrimination
need only be 'rationally supportable' . . . . Title VII authorizes no
such test . . . . It represents a flat and absolute prohibition against
all sex discrimination in conditions of employment.
Id. at 667.
28. 423 U.S. 822 (1975).
29. 429 U.S. at 145-46.
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tion" to mean under Title VII. The Court began by considering
Title VII on its face3 0 and the legislative history surrounding
its enactment.3 1 Finding no definition of sex discrimination in
either source, the Court looked to the guidelines promulgated
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission3 2 and the
cases and concepts concerning sex discrimination under the fourteenth amendment. One of the cases under the fourteenth
33
amendment that the Court considered was Geduldig v. Aiello.
In Geduldig, a group of women attacked a California statutory disability insurance plan. They contended that since the
plan did not include coverage of pregnancy-related disabilities,
it violated their rights under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court took the view that
such under-inclusiveness was not a denial of equal protection.
The Court reached this conclusion by finding that the plan promoted legitimate state interests.3 4 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the state's exclusion of pregnancy from its health
plan did not amount to invidious discrimination under the equal
35
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Analysis
The Supreme Court in Gilbert initially noted that Geduldig
was relevant not only because it was a sex discrimination case,
but also because of its similar factual situation.3 6 In addition, the
30. For the text of Title VII concerning unlawful employment practices, see note 10 supra.
31. The inclusion of the word "sex" within Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act occurred almost as if it were an afterthought, and discussion

of the addition was very brief. Therefore, the legislative history provided the Court with little basis for determining congressional intent as
to the meaning of sex discrimination. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
The amendment to add "sex" to the Civil Rights Act met with opposition from various representatives and women's rights groups. The
thrust of their arguments centered around the point that sex discrimina-

tion involves problems different from those relating to racial or religious

discrimination and the addition of sex to the Act would not be to the
best advantage of women. Id. at 2577. It is interesting to note that
only one of the 11 male members of the House who spoke in favor
of the amendment voted for the Civil Rights Bill as amended. See 110
See generally Miller, Sex Discriminationand
CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 87985 (1967); 110 CONG. REC. 2728, 13837 (1964).
32. See generally notes 58-76 and accompanying text infra.
33. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
34. Id. at 496. In Geduldig, the Court found that the following state
interests justified the plan: maintaining the self-supporting nature of
the program; distributing the sources in such a way so that they are
adequate for the disabilities covered; and maintaining the contribution
level at a rate which would not unduly burden the employees, especially
those in the low income bracket.
35. Id. at 494.
36. 429 U.S. at 133. However, in Rentzer v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973),
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Court stated that in Geduldig it had held that there was no sex
discrimination and that as a result it had been unnecessary to
determine which fourteenth amendment standard of review to
use. Therefore, although Geduldig, unlike Gilbert, was a four-

teenth amendment case, the Court reasoned that Geduldig was
directly on point since it is only a finding of sex-based dis3
crimination which is necessary to prove a violation of Title VII. 1
Sex Discrimination and the Concept of Sex-Unique
Characteristics
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court in Gilbert relied
particularly on "footnote 20" from Geduldig.3B "Footnote 20"
stated in part that, "[w]hile it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like
the California Appellate Court construed California's plan to preclude
only the payment of benefits for disability accompanying normal pregnancy. In this way, the plan was different from General Electric's,
which precluded payments of normal pregnancies'as well as pregnancies
accompanied by complications.
37. 429 U.S. at 136.
38. "Footnote 20" states:
The dissenting opinion to the contrary this case is a far cry from
cases like Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance
program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligiblity because of
gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancyfrom the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only
women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification
like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra. Normal
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers
are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as
with respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender
as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most
cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue
to members of both sexes.
417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. This footnote has become controversial because
commentators have disagreed as to whether it was just dictum or
whether it was added only to combat a rigorous dissent. See, e.g., note
19 supra (lower courts treating "footnote 20" as not controlling). See
generally Larson, Sex Discriminationas to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 805, 809-14 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV.
441, 443-48 (1975); Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel and
Gilbert in the Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, 143-46 (1976); Note,
Pregnancy and Sex-Based Discriminationin Employment: A Post-Aiello
Analysis, 44 CIN. L. REV. 57, 69-74 (1975); Note, Title VII, Pregnancy
and Disability Payments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 381, 387-88 (1976).
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those considered in Reed and Frontiero.'" Essentially, "footnote
20" distinguishes between the situation where men and women
are treated differently because of sex alone, as occurred in Reed
40
and the situation where a difference in treatand Frontiero,
ment is based on a sex-unique 4 1 characteristic. The concept of
sex-unique characteristics is defined as a distinction made affecting only men or only women because of some unique physical
characteristic possessed only by one sex,4 2 such as pregnancy in
The distinction made in
women or beard growth in men.4
"footnote 20" is crucial to the decision in Gilbert and presents
the problem confronted by the Court in determining whether
differences based on the sex-unique characteristic of pregnancy
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Quoting from "footnote 20," the Court stated that the situation in
Gilbert is not a case involving men versus women but pregnant
women versus nonpregnant persons. 44 This implies that sex
discrimination under Title VII can only occur when all disare of one sex and all advantaged persons
advantaged persons
45
are of the other.
Thus, the Court reasoned that since discrimination based
on pregnancy is not one based on gender and since Title VII
applies only to discrimination based on gender, then Title VII
does not apply to discrimination based on pregnancy. 46 The
Court therefore construed the congressional intent as to the
meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII to exclude distinctions based upon the sex-unique characteristic of preg47
nancy.
39. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.

40. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra. In these cases the
sole distinguishing characteristic was a difference in sex.
41. See generally articles cited in note 38 supra. This concept is
sometimes referred to as "sex-linked" or "sex-plus." See, e.g., cases cited
in note 19 supra involving the sex-unique characteristic of pregnancy.
42. Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel and Gilbert in the
Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, 139 (1976).
43. Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D.

Fla. 1972) (where the court held that men are not victims of sex dis-

crimination when forced to shave off their beards, a uniquely male

characteristic, as a condition of employment).
44. 429 U.S. at 135.
45. But see Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971) where the court stated:
The effect of the statute [Title VII] is not to be diluted because
discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the protected class.
Discrimination is not to be tolerated under the guise of physical
properties possessed by one sex ....
46. See Larson, Sex Discrimination as to Maternity Benefits, 1975
DUKE L.J. 805, 811 (1975).
47. However, there are indications in the legislative history of Title

VII to support the position that distinctions on the basis of pregnancy
violate Title VII. See 110 CONC. REC. 2728, 13837 (1964), where an
amendment was proposed in each house of Congress to insert "solely"
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Discriminatory Effect
The Court in Gilbert did not end its analysis by showing that
there was no sex discrimination per se on the face of General
Electric's plan. Instead, it looked to another portion of "footnote
20" which stated that discrimination may also be shown if the
"distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed
to effect an invidious discrimination against members of one
sex or the other. 4'1
However, since pregnancy is significantly
different from other disabilities covered by General Electric's
plan, the Gilbert Court found that the exclusion of pregnancyrelated disability benefits was not a pretext for discriminating
against women."'
In reemphasizing the fact that Gilbert was a Title VII action,
the Court stated that a prima facie violation of the Title is established by proof that a facially neutral classification has a discriminatory effect on a particular group. 0 Even absent proof of
intent to discriminate, the Court stated that a violation of Title
VII is proven if the effect of such a classification is found to be
discriminatory."l
On this point the Court concluded that the
2
burden of showing discriminatory effect had not been sustained.
The Court reasoned that in light of the fact that the same fiscal
and actuarial benefits accrued to both men and women from
General Electric's plan, that since both sexes were equally protected for the same risks and since the plan was not worth more
to men than to women, no gender-based discriminatory effect had
"
been shown, and therefore there was no violation of Title VII. 3
From a different perspective, the dissent approached the question of discriminatory effect by categorizing General Electric's
before the categories of discrimination, so that in order to prove a violation of Title VII the alleged discrimination must have been the only
reason. The purpose of the amendment was to make sure that nothing
would be left uncertain for the Court to interpret. The amendment
however, was defeated. From this it can be inferred that Title VII's
application was not to be limited to discrimination based on sex alone,
but was to include the sex-unique situation.
48. 429 U.S. at 134.
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id. at 137. For a discussion of discriminatory effect, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
51. 401 U.S. at 432.
52. 429 U.S. at 137. However, Justice Brennan in his dissent noted
that the majority could have found discriminatory intent by looking at
General Electric's past history of sex discrimination and the fact that
all other voluntary conditions except pregnancy were covered by the
plan. Id. at 149-53.
53. Id. at 138. Quoting from "footnote 20" the Court stated that
"[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men
are not."
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plan into three sets of effects. 54 First, the plan covered all disabilities mutually affecting men and women. Second, all disabilities that were male-specific or predominantly affected males
were covered. Third, disabilities which were female-specific or
which predominantly affected females were covered, except pregnancy. The dissent stated that the majority focused its analysis
on the first category and therefore the finding of a lack of discriminatory effect was understandable. However, the dissent
found that in light of the coverage of all male-specific disabilities,
the exclusion of pregnancy showed a discriminatory effect on
women. 55
The Court summarized its findings by stating that sex discrimination had not been shown by the terms of General Electric's
plan or by its effect.56 It stated that had such discrimination
as defined in Geduldig been established or had discriminatory
effect been shown, a violation of Title VII would have existed. 7
However, the Court in Gilbert could not end its search for the
meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII without considering the guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
The Role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was the
agency created under Title VII 58 for the general purpose of
preventing employers from participating in any unlawful employment practices in violation of the Title.19 The Commission
was given the authority to issue procedural regulations and guidelines in order to carry out the provisions of Title VII1t)
The Court looked specifically to the provisions of the Guidelines
54. Id. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

55. Cases have held that if an inference of discrimination is shown,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show justification for his
plan. See Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 101920 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. United Bro. of Carpenters & Joiners,
Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971). The majority did
not find such an inference. However, it seems contrary to the general

policy of Title VII not to conclude that at least an inference of discrimination was shown by the fact that all other disabilities were covered except pregnancy.
56. 429 U.S. at 135.
57. Id. at 137 n.15.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as the "EEOC."
59. Id. § 2000e-5(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970) reads in pertinent part:

"The

Commission shall have the authority from time to time to issue, amend,

226 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:215
on Discrimination Because of Sex issued by the EEOC in April
1972, which stated that pregnancy was a temporary disability and
should be treated as such under an employment disability plan.'
The Court decided that although the guidelines were not to be
given "great deference ' 62 in determining legislative intent, they
were entitled to at least some consideration." The Court adopted
the classical rule in Skidmore v. Swift & Co." 4 as the standard
to employ in deciding how much consideration should be given
to the EEOC guidelines. In Skidmore, the Court held that administrative rulings and interpretations were not controlling
upon the courts, although they may be resorted to for guidance.0 ,
The weight to be given these agency pronouncements "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."' ' " In applying the Skidmore standard, the Court noted a 1966 opinion letter issued by
or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of
this subchapter."
See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976), where
the Court stated that Congress did not confer upon the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules or regulations.
61. The relevant portion of the guideline reads as follows:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage,
abortion, childbirth and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan
available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten
employment policies and practices involving matters such as ...
benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any
health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal
or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other
temporary disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1972).
For discussion of the EEOC guidelines, see Comment, Disability
Benefits for PregnantEmployees Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 360, 361-63 (1975); Comment, Current
Trends in Pregnancy Benefits-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DE
PAUL L. REV. 127 (1974); Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel
and Gilbert in the Supreme Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125, 127-38 (1976).
62. But see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 423, 434 (1971) and
cases accompanying note 19 supra. Courts have given other agency
guidelines great deference in determining congressional intent. See
United States v. City of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (Court held that
a definition given to a term by the Interstate Commerce Commission
should be given deference when interpreting the Interstate Commerce
Act because the agency has greater oversight of the problem); Power
Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach.
Workers, AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961) (Court held that regulations issued by the Atomic Energy Commission should be given that
respect which is customarily given to a practical administrative construction of a disputed problem).
63. 429 U.S. at 141.
64. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
65. Id. at 140.
66. Id.
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the General Counsel of the EEOC which stated that an "employer who excludes from its long-term salary continuation program those disabilities which result from pregnancy and childbirth would not be in violation of Title VII'." 7 The Court reasoned that since this letter was inconsistent with the 1972 guidelines, the guidelines should be accorded little weight in determining congressional intent as to the meaning of sex discrimina18
tion.
The Court further noted that the guidelines should carry less
weight because they were enacted almost eight years after Title
VII 0 ' However, in his dissent, Justice Brennan strongly attacked this contention by stating that the length of time before
issuance shows that, at the very least, the 1972 guidelines represented "a particularly conscientious and reasonable product of
EEOC deliberations." 70 In Justice Brennan's view the guidelines therefore should be given great deference. 7 1
The Court also specifically looked to that portion of Title VII's
legislative history which discussed the Equal Pay Act and found
an indication of congressional intent contrary to that which was
promulgated in the EEOC guidelines.7 2 The Court relied on a
Senate amendment to Title VII to the effect that it was not
unlawful for an employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex
in determining the amount of wages or compensation to be paid
if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act.7
The Equal Pay Act
67. General Counsel Opinion Letter, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH)

17,304.49 (Nov. 10, 1966).

See EEOC Decision No. 70-360, 1973 EMPL. PRAC. DEC.
6084 (Dec.
16, 1969) which affirmed the position of the 1966 opinion letter. However, in EEOC Decision No. 71-1474, 1973 EMPL. PRAC. DEc.
6221 (Mar.
19, 1971) the Commission changed its earlier position to that promulgated in the 1972 guidelines.
68. There is further authority for the proposition that the views of
an administrative agency will not be followed when their position flatly
contradicts a previous pronouncement. See, e.g., United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 (1975); F.T.C. v. Jantzen,
Inc., 356 F.2d 253, 257n.4 (9th Cir. 1966).
69. 429 U.S. at 142.
70. Id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In opposition to Justice
Brennan's argument see Comment, Current Trends in Pregnancy Benefits-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 127, 130
(1974), which discusses a deposition taken in the case of Newmon v.
Delta Airlines, 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Sonia Fuentes, Chief

of the Legislative Council Division of the EEOC at the time the guide-

lines were written stated that before issuing the 1972 guidelines no medical or financial studies were conducted, and that she had no expertise in
medicine, economics or labor relations. Fuentes also stated that of the
five people who drafted the guidelines, two were law students.
71. 429 U.S. at 157.
72. Id. at 143. In Espinosa v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973)
the Court stated that great deference may be given to EEOC guidelines
unless they are "inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not
to reach the employment practice in question" or there are "compelling
indications that it is wrong."
73. Senator Bennett's amendment became part of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
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has been interpreted by the Wage and Hour Administrator to
mean that even if an employer makes unequal benefit fund contributions based on sex, for employees of opposite sexes, it does
not violate the Act if the resulting benefits are equal for all
employees.7 4 The Court's finding of a consistency between the
amendment and the interpretations of the Wage and Hour Administrator was construed as showing a clear legislative intent
that not all unequal treatment between sexes is sex discrimination.7 5 Since this was contrary to the EEOC guidelines, the
Court decided that the guidelines should not be followed. 76
The Court's conclusion that the EEOC guidelines were not
indicative of congressional intent lends further support to its
decision that Congress did not intend Title VII to include distinctions between men and women based upon the sex-unique
characteristic of pregnancy. The Gilbert Court's holding that
the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from General
Electric's disability insurance plan did not constitute sex dis2(h) (1970). The amendment stated:
•...
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex
in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or
to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29 [The
Equal Pay Act].
See 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) which states that this amendment
was necessary to make sure the provision of the Equal Pay Act would
not be nullified if a conflict arose between it and Title VII.
74. The Wage & Hour Administrator, having the authority to interpret the Equal Pay Act stated:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or similar
benefits to employees are equal for both men and women, no wage
differential prohibited by the equal pay provisions will result from
such payments, even though the benefits which accrue to the employees in question are greater for one sex than for the other. The
mere fact that the employer may make unequal contributions for
employees of opposite sexes in such a situation will not, however,
be considered to indicate that the employer's payments are in violation of section 6(d), if the resulting benefits are equal for such employees.
29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1975).
75. 429 U.S. at 145.
76. However, Justice Brennan's dissent points out instances which
show that the guidelines are consistent with congressional intent:
[Plrior to 1972, Congress enacted just such a pregnancy inclusive
rule to govern the distribution of benefits for 'sickness' under the
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 351 (K) (2).
Furthermore, shortly following the announcement of the EEOC's
rule, Congress approved .

.

. an essentially identical promulgation

by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. (1970 ed., Supp.
II) § 1681(a). See 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1976). Moreover, federal
workers subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
now are eligible for maternity and pregnancy coverage under their
sick leave program. See Federal Personnel Manual, c.630, subch. 13
§ 13-2 (FPM Supp. 990-2, May 6,1975).
Id. at 158.
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crimination in violation of Title VII presents interesting implications for the future of the working woman and Title VII.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GILBERT DECISION

As a result of the Supreme Court decision in Gilbert, Congress and various other interested parties have taken positive
steps to negate its effects. For instance, the EEOC decided to
stand firm in its position that the denial of pregnancy-related disability payments from an insurance plan constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 77 In like manner, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the denial of such disability
benefits was impermissible discrimination in violation of the
New York Human Rights Law.-I
On March 15, 1977, legislation was introduced in both houses
of Congress which would amend Title VII to specifically prohibit
discrimination based on pregnancy.79 If the proposed amendment is passed, the Gilbert decision will lose its precedential
value and the denial of pregnancy-related disability benefits
will constitute a prima facie violation of Title VII.80 If Congress chooses not to pass the amendment thereby leaving Gilbert
in effect, it will remain lawful under Title VII for a private employer to discriminate on the basis of a sex-unique characteristic,

77. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) % 3200 (Dec. 30, 1976).
However,
at the present time, the EEOC has ceased processing allegations identical
to those in Gilbert, in light of the decision rendered in that case. Id.
78. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393 (1976).
"The determination of
the Supreme Court, while instructive, is not binding on our court.
Id. at 87 n.1, 359 N.E.2d at 395 n.1.
79. The proposed amendnent reads as follows:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth
or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in . . . this
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
S.995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Extensive lobbying by the Campaign to End Discrimination Against
Pregnant Workers was responsible for the introduction of the amendment. Its passage is being supported by many organizations including
major feminist groups, labor unions, the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights and the National Education Association.
The Spokeswoman,
April 15, 1977 at 1. At the time of this printing, the proposed amendment has been passed by the Senate. For a discussion of the amendment
see 123 CONG. REc. 4142-45 (1977).
80. It should be noted that notwithstanding the amendment, actions
brought under the fourteenth amendment would continue to be controlled by the holding of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and
the denial of pregnancy-related benefits would continue to be constitutionally permissible.

230 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:215

specifically, pregnancy."'
Furthermore, if the amendment to
Title VII is not passed, the Gilbert decision may prove to have
varied sociological implications for the working woman. Today,
with a greater dependency on women as a means of financial
support, the Gilbert decision places the families of such women
in serious economic jeopardy should they become pregnant and
have to leave work without disability compensations 2 Therefore, such a decision may serve to either discourage working
women, who cannot afford the loss of income, from becoming
pregnant or encourage them to resort to an early termination of
8 3

their pregnancies.

Marcia Lynn Cohen

81. This decision seems to possess overtones of the earlier twentieth
century cases where women were necessarily thought to be in need of
protection. By allowing an employer to discriminate against women
based on pregnancy, the practical implication may be to put women back
into the home, where they were historically thought to belong.
Approximately 46% of all
82. See 123 CONG. REC. 4143 (1977).
women over 16 years are in the labor force; 39 million are working or
seeking work. Twenty-five million of these women are doing so because of the basic need to support their families.
83. Id.

